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1st MIBARS In Vietnam! |
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Witness I |
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Recollections of the 1st MIBARS In Vietnam By the Men Who Were There |
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Looking Back |
"Years later I'd reflect on the fact that there were guys I should have said good-bye to, but didn't have the chance. There were guys whose home addresses I should have gotten, but never did. There were people I had grown closer to than my own family, but I would never write to them, never see them again. Unlike veterans from World War II, who went home as a unit on board troop ships where they could decompress together, who stayed in touch, who joined VFW and Legion posts so keep the connection, Vietnam vets rarely did and we were the worse for it. Maybe we thought that when our war was over, we really wanted it to be over, with all ties to it severed. Or, if we didn't consciously think it, we acted as though we did. What I had no way of knowing as I rushed to get the chopper for the first leg of the journey home was that while I may have been finished with the war, it wasn't finished with me. By the time I realized that it might help if I could find the guys who lived through it with me, they weren't there to be found, and I had no idea how to find them." |
Gary D. Mitchell, with Michael Hirsh, "A Sniper's Journey: The Truth About the Man Behind the Rifle," 2006, Penguin Group, New York, New York |
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Crew Chief, Delivery Platoon, Assigned To Detachment B, July 1967 - July 1968 |
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Above Right: Good Guy 182 on the PSP hardstand at Marble Mountain Air Base in 1967. Left: A wingtip view of the U6A deHavilland Beaver, with open pilot's door, showing the sturdy undercarriage and high ground clearance characteristic of an aircraft designed for carrying cargo into unimproved landing sites. |
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An impromptu "B" Detachment gathering at the Modern Hotel in DaNang, RVN, c. 1968. Troopers assembled here include S. Williamson, R. Berryman, P. Cumber and, perhaps, Shaugnessy. |
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And Another Ally In the Fight |
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Left: This 1st MIBARS trooper, assigned to "E" Detachment in Phu Bai, just north of DaNang, takes a look at a Browning air-cooled .30 caliber light machine gun during a visit to a unit of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Tiger Division. The ROKs, are not recalled as being particularly active in Saigon and DaNang, but they were elsewhere and did enjoy a reputation as being fearsome soldiers. Stories abounded of the heads of dispatched Viet Cong guerrillas -- skewered on poles and mounted around ROK jungle encampments -- as a "don't mess with me" type of warning for hostiles to stay away. In Saigon, they were particularly noted for their reconnaissance abilities. In particular, it was said that ROK troops -- whose pay was subsidized by the US Government -- dispatched radio-equipped vehicles to post exchanges every morning to determine the availability of highly desirable consumer merchandize such as reel-to-reel tape decks, turntables, speakers, amplifiers and cameras. The list of available brands was legendary -- Teac, Akai, Sansui, Panasonic, Sony, JVC, Kenwood, BSR, Technics and Pioneer stereo equipment, as well as Nikon, Pentax and Topcon cameras. Reports on the availability of merchandise were then broadcast to ROK units in the area using tactical radios and command net frequencies. Shortly thereafter, hordes of ROK soldiers were said to arrive in jeeps and trucks and clean out stocks of desirable items in the PXs. |
A Word On the Combat Efficiency of the South Koreans |
"The strategy and tactics of the Korean Tiger Division were a marked contrast to the American [s] . . . The Koreans were fighting a war of territorial occupation, a more classic war scheme. Performance measurement, either at the individual or unit level, or whether it be attributed to plan or execution, was more finite, more concrete. Whereas the Koreans took longer to prepare and launch an operation, their results were more permanent. They pushed out the VC by killing and capturing, then occupied the territory, fighting for it only once. The Korean forces maintained a presence in the pacified territory, working with the local villagers and farmers. Seized rice was directed into the open market, as were the subsequent harvests. They were products of a common culture and identified with the people. The VC were reluctant to return to, or challenge, the ROKs. . . . [T]echnical and logistical support for the Koreans was limited. They relied on he weapons they used in the Korean War, thirteen years prior. Helicopter support was rationed and prioritized, requiring more emphasis on conventional infantry tactics. The Koreans practiced detailed and systematic planning. Reflecting their Oriental culture, they were patient, foregoing the short-term opportunity to achieve longer-term results. They were masters of small-unit tactics – by the book with reliance on unit integrity and the chain of command. Whereas the [American forces] used helicopters and distant fire bases to prove and fix the enemy, the Koreans stole out of camp prior to sunset to stealthily patrol and set up ambushes. Tac air [tactical air] support was available, but on a lesser scale. Coordination was difficult at the squad or platoon level, due to the language differences. But they were tenacious fighters, schooled in discipline, and accustomed to hardship." |
John F. Flanagan, Vietnam Above the Treetops: A Forward Air Controller Reports, Praeger Publishers, New York, NY, 1992 |
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